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null.57 In the usual case, as in Gredler, the will held absolutely
null contained only one disposition; therefore, no great damage
was done. But if a will provided for multiple dispositions, only
one of which was tainted by a prohibited substitution, the juris-
prudence stating that the entire will is null might lead the court
to an improper result. To avoid this error, the courts should,
upon finding a prohibited substitution in a testament, hold only
the tainted disposition an absolute nullity, leaving the remainder
of the will valid.5
In conclusion, it seems that the result in Crichton v. Succes-
sion of Gredler is correct, but the approach of the court to the
problem as well as its reasons for the result cannot be sanc-
tioned under the new Trust Code. It is hoped that the Louisiana
courts will take more notice of our new Trust Code in the future,
and reach decisions in accord with its affirmative, liberal attitude
toward the trust.
Thomas Crichton, IV*
HUSON AND THE FIFTH CIRcurr-A RETURN TO SNIPES?
In December, 1965, plaintiff suffered injuries while working
on a fixed drilling platform on the outer continental shelf, off
Louisiana's Gulf Coast. In January, 1968, he filed suit against
the owner and operator of the fixed rig in federal district court
under Louisiana's general personal injury tort recovery statute.2
57. LA Civ. CODE art. 1520 provides in pertinent part: ... Every disposi-
tion not in trust by which the donee, the heir, or legatee is charged to pre-
serve for and to return a thing to a third person Is null, even with regard
to the donee, the instituted heir, or the legatee." (Emphasis supplied.)
58. An example of this approach is shown in Succession of Smart, 214
La. 63, 67-68, 36 So.2d 639, 640-41 (1948): "The fact that there are bequests
of particular legacies in the will that contain prohibited provisions or
substitutions such would destroy only those legacies and would not effect
[sic] the will as a whole. It is well settled that the invalidity of a portion
of a will does not destroy the will in its entirety. Succession of Lissa, 195
La. 438, 196 So. 924, and the authorities cited therein to that effect."
*The student Board of Editors wishes it noted that it requested the
author to write this Note, despite his having a personal interest as an
alternate beneficiary under the trust, since the importance and complexity
of the subject matter required maximum access to research data. We be-
lieved that he could and would write a scholarly analysis of this important
case as unaffected as humanly possible by that personal interest.
1. 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nuws 2178 (1953). The continental shelf is an
extension of the coastal land which slopes down gradually to 600 feet below
sea level. In the Gulf of Mexico, the shelf extends to a maximum of 200 miles
out and the average distance is 93 miles.
2. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2315.
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The district court held that plaintiff's action was barred by Lou-
isiana's one-year prescriptive period,8 in accordance with the
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Outer Con-
tinental Shelf Lands Act 4 (hereinafter, "Lands Act") in Rodrigue
v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.5 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed reasoning that as pre-
scription is not substantive, but merely procedural in nature,
the timeliness of the action is governed by the federal maritime
doctrine of laches.0 Huson v. Chevron Oil Co., 430 F.2d 27 (5th
Cir. 1970), rehearing denied, cert. applied for Sept. 14, 1970.
This decision affects the legal remedies of all offshore
workers on fixed platforms on the outer shelf. The outer con-
tinental shelf is an area of vital and growing importance, pri-
marily because of society's ever increasing demand for oil and
other mineral resources.7 Since the first drilling of a successful
offshore oil well in 1947,8 more than 9000 wells of various types
have been attempted,9 involving thousands of workers. Because
of the growing need for these resources, even more men will
be working on the shelf in the future.'0
Workers on fixed rigs are not "seamen" in the traditional
sense" and have been found by courts not to be entitled to
3. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3536.
4. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43, (1953). The Lands Act covers only those areas
lying outside the state territorial boundary which is defined as three
geographical miles out. 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1953). However, both Texas' and
Florida's boundaries extend three marine leagues (or nine geographical
miles). See United States v. Florida 363 U.S. 121, 129 (1959); United States
v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 64 (1959).
5. 395 U.S. 352 (1969).
6. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAw OF ADMIRALTY §§ 9-80 (1957). Laches
is basically an equitable doctrine in admiralty which acts as a statute of
limitations. However, It is not a fixed period of time, but flexible and more
or less at the court's discretion. The admiralty court will not dismiss an
action due to the mere passage of time, but they will consider both the
extent of the delay and the degree of prejudice to the defendant resulting
from the delay.
7. NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL, PETROLEUM RESOURCES UNDER THE OCEAN
FLOOR 6-7 (1969).
8. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, HISTORY OF PETROLEUM ENGINEERING 13
(1961).
9. NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL, PETROLEUM RESOURCES UNDER THE OCEAN
FLOOR 17 (1969).
10. For discussion regarding potential users of this area, see Comment, 31
LA. L. REv. 108 (1970).
11. Cf. treatment given workers on submersible or mobile drilling rigs.
In Comment, 27 LA. L. REv. 757, 775 (1967) the writer states:
"It seems settled that a worker injured aboard a submersible drilling
barge or mobile platform while a member of the rig's crew will be able
to recover under the Jones Act and maritime law as a seaman." See also
Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959).
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many of the legal benefits available to seamen.12 The first legis-
lation to cover maritime workers, not classified as seamen, was
the Death on the High Seas Act 18 (hereinafter, "Seas Act"),
under which recoveries were limited to pecuniary loss for
wrongful death occurring on the high seas.'4 In 1953, Congress,
in the Lands Act, first enacted legislation specifically designed
to govern workers on fixed platforms on the outer continental
shelf. Although the primary purpose of the act was to establish
the right of the federal government to develop natural resources
on the "shelf,"' 5 the act also sought to establish a body of civil
and criminal laws to govern the subsoil, seabed, and the fixed
platforms thereon.16
12. A worker classified as a seaman can proceed under the Jones Act,
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1920) and the general maritime law which allows much
broader possibilities for recovery than his land-based counterpart. The sea,-
man can even recover benefits without proving his employer's negligence
under the doctrine of unseaworthiness of the vessel. See Note, 30 LA. L. REv.
519, 520 (1970) for a more comprehensive discussion of the disparities in
remedies available to seaman and non-seaman.
13. 46 U.S.C. § 761-68 (1920).
14. Note, 30 LA. L. REv. 519, 521 (1970). See 46 U.S.C. § 762 (1920).
15. 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2177 (1953).
16. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1332-33 (a) (1953).
§ 1332: "(a) It is declared to be the policy of the United States that
the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain to the United
States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition
as provided in this subchapter.
(b) This subchapter shall be construed in such manner that the char-
acter as high seas of the waters above the outer Continental Shelf and
the right to navigation and fishing therein shall not be affected."
§ 1333: "(a) (1) The Constitution and laws and civil and political juris-
diction of the United States are extended to the subsoil and seabed of the
outer Continental Shelf and to all artificial islands and fixed structures
which may be erected thereon for the purposes of exploring for, develop-
ing, removing, and transporting resources therefrom, to the same extent
as if the outer Continental Shelf were an area of exclusive Federal juris-
diction located within a State: Prov4ded, however, That mineral leases
on the outer Continental Shelf shall be maintained or issued only under
the provisions of this subchapter.
(2) To the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent with
this subchapter or with other Federal laws and regulations of the Secretary
now in effect or hereafter adopted, the civil and criminal laws of each ad-jacent State as of August 7, 1953 are declared to be the law of the United
States for that portion of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental
Shelf, and artificial islands and fixed structures erected thereon, which
would be within the area of the State if its boundaries were extended sea-
ward to the outer margin of the outer Continental Shelf, and the President
shall determine and publish in the Federal Register such projected lines
extending seaward and defining each such area. All of such applicable laws
shall be administered and enforced by the appropriate officers and courts
of the United States. State taxation laws shall not apply to the outer
Continental Shelf.
(3) The provisions of this section for adoption of State law as the
law of the United States shall never be interpreted as a basis for claim-
ing any interest in or jurisdiction on behalf of any State for any purpose
NOTES
The Lands Act provision adopting state law in civil actions 7
did not receive careful judicial interpretation until 1961 in
Pure Oil Co. v. Snipes, 8 an action involving the claim of an
offshore worker for personal injuries suffered in the scope of his
employment on the rig. The Fifth Circuit rejected the defen-
dant's argument that the Lands Act should be interpreted liter-
ally'9 and held that it was the "intention of Congress that (a)
this occurrence be governed by Federal, not State, law, and (b)
that the Federal law thereby promulgated would be the per-
vasive maritime law of the United States. '2°
Judge Brown, speaking for a unanimous court, reasoned
that it was completely untenable that Congress intended for
this important area to be left to the "shifting policies of adjacent
states."2' 1 In its interpretation of the Lands Act, the court found
two specific indications that Congress intended for the federal
maritime law to apply. First, Congress had given to the Coast
Guard the duty to promulgate and enforce the laws and safety
regulations on these artificial islands.2 2 Secondly, the Federal
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act 28 was
expressly adopted as the basis of compensation claims.24 Once
maneuvering themselves under the general maritime law, the
court had little difficulty in disregarding the adjacent state
statute of limitations and holding that the action was timely
commenced under the doctrine of laches. 25 The court in Snipes
did not question Congressional power to enact whatever legis-
lation Congress deemed desirable for the "shelf" area. But it
was their opinion that Congress intended that these fixed rigs
be governed by the pervasive maritime law.2 6 The Fifth Circuit
continued to uphold the Snipes reasoning in subsequent cases,2 7
finally culminating in Loffiand Brothers Co. v. Roberts, where
over the seabed and subsoil of the outer Continental Shelf, or the property
and natural resources thereof or the revenues therefrom."
17. Ird. § 1333(a)(2).
18. 293 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1961).
19. See 43 U.S.C. § 1333 (a) (2) (1953) at note 16 supra.
20. Pure Oil Co. v. Snipes, 293 F.2d 60, 64 (5th Cir. 1961).
21. Id. at 69.
22. Id. at 66. See 43 U.S.C. § 1333(e) (1953).
23. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1927).
24. Plure Oil Co. v. Snipes, 293 F.2d 60, 67 (5th Cir. 1961); see 43 U.S.C.§ 1333(c) (1953).
25. Pure Oil Co. v. Snipes, 293 F.2d 60, 70 (5th Cir. 1961).
26. Id. at 64.
27. E.g., Ocean Drilling & Explor. Co. v. Berry Bros. Oilfleld Serv., 377
F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1967); Movible Offshore v. Ousley, 346 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.
1965).
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they concluded "that Congress deemed the hazards presented
by the offshore drilling platforms to be maritime in nature, and
governed by Federal maritime law. '28 Also, under the Snipes
reasoning, the Seas Act had been held to provide the exclusive
remedy for any wrongful death to non-seamen occurring outside
state territorial boundaries.29
However, the.Fifth Circuit's judicial reasoning in Snipes and
its progeny was completely undermined in 1969 by the Supreme
Court in Rodrigue, an action for wrongful death occurring on
the outer continental shelf. In reversing the Fifth Circuit, the
Supreme Court held that the Seas Act was inapplicable, and
petitioner's remedy was governed by the adjacent state law.80
The Rodrigue Court was very conscious of the intent of
Congress in enacting the Lands Act.81 Justice White, speaking
for a unanimous court, concluded that it was Congress' intent
that "these artificial islands, though surrounded by the high
seas, were not in themselves to be considered within maritime
jurisdiction.''82 (Emphasis added.)
Of particular importance to an understanding of subsequent
discussion is the Supreme Court's underlying reason for holding
as they did in Rodrigue. It can be argued that since the Supreme
Court recognized that in this case Louisiana law would afford
a more liberal award,38 the motive behind the decision was to
28. 386 F.2d 540, 545 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1040 (1968).
29. Dore v. Link Belt Co., 391 F.2d 671, 675 (5th Cir. 1968). See also
Higa v. Transocean Airlines, 230 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1955).
For more recent developments in wrongful death actions see Moragne
v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), discussed in Note, 31 LA.
L. REv. 165 (1970), where the Court allowed an action for recovery in state
territorial waters under general maritime law.
30. Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969). The court
also noted that "the Lands Act makes it clear that federal law, supplemented
by state law of the adjacent state, is to be applied to these artificial islands
as though they were federal enclaves in an upland State. This approach
was deliberately taken in lieu of treating the structures as vessels, to
which admiralty law supplemented by the law of the jurisdiction of the
vessel's owner would apply .... [T]he Lands Act deliberately eschewed the
application of admiralty principles to these novel structures [fixed rigs]."
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 355.
31. Id. at 363.
"Careful scrutiny of the hearings which were the basis for eliminating
from the Lands Act the treatment of artificial islands as vessels convinces
us that the motivation for this change together with the adoption of state
law as surrogate federal law, was the view that maritime law was inapposite
to these fixed structures."
32. Id. at 365-66.
33. Id,. at 361.
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extend broader possibilities of recovery to offshore workers.4
However, from the general thrust of the case and the strong
language used, it is evident that the Court's underlying reason
for this decision was simply a recognition of and agreement
with the intent of Congress in passing the Lands Act. It was
the Court's interpretation that Congress felt that the interests
of these workers would best be served by adopting adjacent
state law as the controlling federal law since the workers were
"closely tied to the adjacent states." 35 In fact, as one writer
stated, the focal thought underlying Rodrigue was the removal
of tort actions arising on fixed platforms from admiralty juris-
diction.86
The Fifth Circuit in Huson while agreeing that petitioner's
substantative right via the Rodrigue decision and the Lands Act
is governed by Louisiana law, held that since prescription is
procedural, the timeliness of his action is governed by the federal
maritime doctrine of laches.3 Chief Judge Brown, who had
written the Snipes decision, was again the organ of the court.
He was quick to point out the distinction between a procedural
restraint such as peremption which bars the right sought to be
enforced and one that is purely procedural, such as Louisiana's
prescriptive period for personal injuries.8s The court based its
decision on uncontradicted authority that "[i]n keeping with
accepted conflicts principles 'purely procedural provisions may
be overlooked,' "9 thereby allowing petitioner an action even
though it would be barred by Louisiana's one-year prescriptive
period. The Fifth Circuit's dissatisfaction with the impact of
34. As observed by LeBlano & McNamara, Reflections on Rodrigue, 36
INs. COUNSS L J. 626, 628 (1969), the increased recovery made possible by
Rodrigue can be dramatic. For example, in Fontenot v. Nicklos Drilling Co.,
Civil No. 12-064 (W.D. La., 1970), the court awarded $100,960.84 for pecuniary
loss. In light of Rodrigue, an additional $103,788.65 was granted for loss of
support, loss of love, and grief and anguish, thereby more than doubling
the recovery.
35. Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 363 (1969).
36. Swaim, Yes, Virginia, There is an Admiralty: The Rodrigue Case,
16 LoyoLA L. REv. 43, 78 (1970). While personally disagreeing with the
desirability of the decision, Professor Swaim stated "the very basis for the'
decision in Rodrigue was that maritime law is Inapplicable to such struc-
tures and thus admiralty is completely excluded."
37. Huson v. Chevron Oil Co., 430 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1970).
38. Id. at 31.
The court seems to recognize that in wrongful death actions, LA. Crv.
CODs art. 2315, "prescribes both the right and time," and In these cases
laches would not apply.
39. Id. See Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648 (1953); Kenney v. Trinidad
Corp., 349 F.2d. 832 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1030 (1966).
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Rodrigue in limiting the recovery of injured workers is implicit
in Huson. The court pointed out the "sometimes prohibitive
principles of contributory negligence," and short prescriptive
periods which in many cases would bar the worker's action. @
They reasoned that since the Rodrigue-declared statutory pur-
pose of the Lands Act was to improve the lot of the adjacent
shore-based worker, any decision limiting their recovery "should
certainly be avoided," if at all possible.41 Another factor in the
court's decision was their concern for uniformity42 and "elim-
inating disparities having nothing to do with substantive obliga-
tions but arising from the sheer accident of geographical loca-
tions in, on, over or around the high seas."
This decision seems desirable in light of the modern human-
itarian trend of facilitating recovery.44 Further, it adds a degree
of uniformity by eliminating some of the disparities of remedies
which would occur if each adjacent state's prescriptive periods
were followed in personal injury cases.45 However, disparities
will still exist. One example is that in wrongful death actions,
the plaintiff will still be barred by Louisiana's one-year per-
emption.4 e Also in questions of contributory negligence and
assumption of risk, the plaintiff's right to recover will vary
-from state to state.
The propriety of the court's reasoning in Huson is question-
able. The decision was based on a distinction drawn between
procedural and substantive law. This distinction has no basis in
Rodrigue and apparently was merely a clever judicial maneuver
by the Fifth Circuit in attempting to reconcile their prior posi-
tion in Snipes, that Congress intended for maritime law to apply,
with the Rodrigue decision. Their technique is unsound for
40. Huson v. Chevron Oil Co., 430 F.2d 27,28 (1970). Chief Judge Brown stated
that although the Supreme Court determined that it was the conviction of
-Congress that the interests of these offshore workers "would be served
best by adopting the law of the adjacent state as controlling federal law,
the ink was scarcely dry when It became evident that the result might be
-quite something else."
41. Id. at 28.
42. Id. at 32. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 1788
(1970).
43. Huson v. Chevron Oil Co., 430 F.2d 27, 32 (1970).
44. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THm LAW OF ADMIRALTY §§ 6-60 (1957).
45. Huson v. Chevron Oil Co., 430 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1970). An example
of these disparities is demonstrated by the various statutes of limitation.
In Louisiana the plaintiff would have only one year in which to institute
suit (IA. Civ. CoDE art. 3536), while a worker based off the Mississippi Coast
would have six years (Miss. COD AlN. § 722 (1942)).
46. LA. COv. CoDE art. 2315.
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several reasons. First, one of the court's major premises was
that in adjudicating the claims of fixed platform workers they
were still an admiralty court. If this were true, then Judge
Brown's argument would be correct, since admiralty courts
are not bound by a state's procedural statutes of limitation,
but by the equitable doctrine of laches.47
However, since the effect of Rodrigue was to remove fixed
rigs on the outer continental shelf from admiralty jursidiction,48
this was not an admiralty court sitting to enforce general mari-
time law, but a federal court sitting to enforce a federal statute.
It is clear that when Congress specifically enacts a statute of
limitations to govern a particular cause of action, it must be
followed, making the common law doctrine of laches inappro-
priate.49 Under the Lands Act, once the hurdle "applicable and
not inconsistent" is cleared, the adjacent state's law becomes
federal law, which logically includes its prescriptive period as
well.
Secondly, even if the Lands Act did not specifically adopt
the adjacent state's prescriptive periods, they should still be
controlling unless their application would be contrary to an
overriding federal interest.50 The Fifth Circuit relied on the
"overriding federal interest" of uniformity in disregarding the
Louisiana one-year prescriptive period.51 However, the court
overlooked the fact that Congress and the Supreme Court had
both asserted that the adjacent states have a vital interest in
these offshore workers because of their close ties with these
workers. 2
A third argument used by the Hus n court was that in light
of the Lands Act, there was "federal 'law' or procedural practice
47. Czaplicki v. Hoegh Silvercloud, 351 U.S. 525, 533 (1956); Levinson v.
Deupree, 345 U.S. 648, 652 (1953); Kenney v. Trinidad Corp., 349 F.2d 832,
837 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1030 (1966).
48. Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 360 (1969).
"The accidents in question here involved no collision with a vessel, and
the structures were not navigational aids. They were islands, albeit artificial
ones . . . and the accidents had no more connection with the ordinary stuff
of admiralty than do accidents on piers. Indeed, the Court has specifically
held that drilling platforms are not within admiralty jurisdiction." See
notes 30, 31 spra.
49. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946); Burnett v. New York
Cent. R.R., 332 F.2d 529 (6th Cir. 1964).
50. United Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 701-04
(1966). See also Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68
(1966); Charney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 97, 99 (6th Cir. 1967).
51. Huson v. Chevron Oil Co., 430 F.2d 27, 32 (5th Cir. 1970).
52. Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 363 (1969).
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which adequately" covered the situation, and therefore the state
prescriptive period was not applicable.58 It is submitted that
this argument is untenable. When Congress spoke of gaps in
federal "laws" it meant federal substantive law, not procedural
practice, as was clearly shown by the Supreme Court in Rodrigue,
where it noted the report of the Senate Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs.5 4 Under the Huson approach, there would
never be a need for using adjacent state law to determine peti-
tioner's right of action for personal injuries suffered since
"general maritime law" provides such actions, and there is federal
law or practice which "covers the situation."
In the writer's opinion, the most logical treatment of the
Rodrigue holding is found in Guillory v. Humble Oil & Refining
Co. where the district court reasoned that:
"[T]he Lands Act, when it made state law applicable
in the absence of conflicting applicable federal law, did
not differentiate between procedural and substantive law.
There is here no applicable federal law pertaining to the
time within which such a suit for personal injuries or death
shall be filed. The doctrine of laches is peculiar to maritime
law, and Rodrigue teaches that maritime law cannot be
applied to this case [personal injury] . . . . Thus, since
plaintiff derives his right or cause of action by virtue of
state law, made applicable by the Lands Act, he must also
accept the prescriptive period specifically provided by the
same state law which created his right or cause of action. '55
But whether the Supreme Court will follow its literal holding
in Rodrigue or will expand that decision to, reconcile it with
Huson is really immaterial because lack of uniformity and
inequities will still exist leaving many areas of confusion as to
what rights and remedies are available.
The Supreme Court has long recognized the desirability of
uniformity in admiralty, 6 but obviously has been unable to
53. Huson v. Chevron Oil Co., 430 F.2d 27, 31 (5th Cir. 1970).
54. S. REP. No. 411, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1953). In introducing the
proposed legislation, the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs ex-
plained: "Paragraph (2) [43 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (1953)] adopts State law as
Federal law, to be used when Federal statutes or regulations of the Sec-
retary of the Interior are inapplicable." (Emphasis added.)
55. Guillory v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 310 F. Supp. 230, 232 (E.D. La.
1970).
56. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970); The Lotta-
wanna, 88 U.S. 558, 575 (1875).
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achieve it judicially. It would seem that the best way to achieve
the dual goals of equity and uniformity would be for Congress
to pass pervasive legislation equalizing the legal rights and
remedies for all offshore workers on fixed or submersible rigs,
both within and without state territorial waters. It is hoped
that the Rodrigue and Huson decisions will point out the desir-
ability, if not the necessity, of definitively establishing a general
body of law covering these workers and others injured or killed
while on the continental shelf.
Alvin Michael Dufilho
RELATION OF PERSONAL INJURY AWARDS TO
THE COMMUNITY: A NEED FOR REVISION
In Louisiana, the relation of personal injury awards to the
community of acquets and gains is regulated by articles 2334
and 2402 of the Civil Code. Several recent decisions in this area
show a profound need for legislative revision.
In Chambers v. Chambers judgment in district court was
rendered decreeing that a sum of money obtained after a judg-
ment of divorce, but in settlement for personal injuries sustained
by the husband during the existence of his marriage, was com-
munity property and that the plaintiff wife was entitled to one
half of this judgment. The husband appealed from this judg-
ment. In overturning the decision below, the First Circuit Court
of Appeal conceded that "[Civil Code] Article 2334 is the source
article on the subject with respect to the husband's rights and
this article is clear, unambiguous, and represents the solemn
expression of the Legislative will. '2 That article declares: "Ac-
tions for damages resulting from offenses and quasi-offenses
suffered by the husband, living separate and apart from his wife
by reason of fault on her part, sufficient for separation or di-
vorce shall be his separate property." Furthermore, "[c]ommon
property is that which is acquired by husband and wife during
marriage, in any manner different from that above stated."
Nevertheless, the court stated that "our appreciation of [Civil
Code] Article 2334, in light of the particular facts of this case,
1. 238 So.2d 30 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
2. Id. at 34.
3. A. CIv. CODM art. 2334.
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